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ABSTRACT
PHILIP HOWARD: Asset Pricing at the Zero Lower Bound.
(Under the direction of Mariano M. Croce)
In a New-Keynesian model subject to the zero lower bound (ZLB), constrained monetary pol-
icy endogenously results in time-varying equity risk premia and equity-bond market correlations.
Liquidity traps at the ZLB are characterized by negatively skewed and increasingly uncertain con-
sumption growth, labor growth, and inflation. Investors with recursive preferences price the liq-
uidity traps, resulting in rising equity risk premiums. Real bond yields and equity returns become
negatively correlated at the ZLB, while positive in normal times. The model provides a general
equilibrium foundation for 1) the time-varying comovement amongst macroeconomic quantities
and asset prices observed during the the Great Recession and 2) why real bonds ceased to provide
investors with insurance at the ZLB, precisely when they valued it most.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Should the hedging abilities of government securities differ when monetary policy is con-
strained? In this paper, I answer this question by characterizing the asset pricing implications
of monetary policy at the zero lower bound (ZLB). I show that a New-Keynesian model featuring
investors with recursive preferences and a central bank subject to an occasionally binding ZLB
constraint endogenously produces increasing equity risk premia and time-varying correlations be-
tween equity and bond markets. In equilibrium, real bonds hedge productivity declines during
normal times and bear deflation risk during recessions.
The Great Recession was marked by stark comovements amongst macroeconomic quantities
and asset prices. The U.S. saw large declines in productivity growth, consumption growth, labor,
and inflation. Consumption growth became increasingly uncertain. The Federal Reserve’s tradi-
tional policy tool became restricted by the effective ZLB at the recession’s trough. In the run-up
to the ZLB, nominal and real yields fell. At the ZLB, breakeven inflation yields sharply declined
while real yields rose. At the same time, equity prices were declining. The negative equity-real
bond correlation at the ZLB contrasts with the empirical observation that equity returns are posi-
tively correlated with real bond yields on average.
I show that a New-Keynesian model subject to the ZLB is empirically consistent with the dy-
namics during the Great Recession and provides a general equilibrium foundation for the observed
time-varying comovement amongst macroeconomic quantities and asset prices during times of
constrained monetary policy. More broadly, empirical observations of the ZLB are infrequent in
the data, which makes measuring time-varying risk premia difficult. The model provides theoreti-
cal insight into the dynamics of risk premia during these extreme times.
In the model, intertemporal allocations depend on two channels: a wage channel and a savings
channel. The central bank sets the price of nominal bonds according to a Taylor rule subject to
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the ZLB. Monopolistic competitive firms choose labor and prices to maximize profits. Inflation
endogenously results as the discounted sum of firms’ future marginal costs. Households optimally
choose consumption, labor supply, and nominal bond holdings. In response to a negative long-
run supply news shock, wages fall and households supply less labor. To counteract this via the
savings channel, the central bank lowers the nominal interest rate, which decreases households’
incentive to save, stimulates aggregate demand, and increases demand for labor. On net, the wage
channel dominates and labor declines. Declining labor implies declining marginal costs and falling
inflation.
At the ZLB, monetary policy becomes constrained and cannot further stimulate the economy,
resulting in a liquidity trap a` la Krugman (1998). Households foresee falling future prices and
delay current consumption, decreasing current aggregate demand and further decreasing demand
for labor. Thus in normal times, the savings channel counteracts the wage channel, while at the
ZLB, the savings channel amplifies the effects of the wage channel. The liquidity trap at the ZLB
results in larger declines in consumption, labor, and inflation with respect to negative long-run
productivity news relative to normal times. Hence, the ZLB is characterized by negatively skewed
and increasingly uncertain macrofundamentals.
With respect to asset prices, liquidity traps at the ZLB result in an increasing equity risk pre-
mium and time-varying equity-bond market correlations. In the model, equity is measured as a
levered consumption claim. The ZLB results in negatively skewed and increasingly uncertain eq-
uity returns. In response to the increased downside risk at the ZLB, risk averse investors demand a
higher equity risk premium.
Consistent with the data, real yields hedge productivity risk in normal times. In response to
negative long-run productivity news, real bond prices rise. In contrast at the ZLB, negative long-
run productivity news decreases expected inflation persistently. Given the constraint of the ZLB,
real yields rise to offset falling expected inflation. Hence real bonds bear deflation risk at the ZLB.
Noting the implications for the time-varying comovement of equity and bond markets, the
model implies equity returns and real bond yields are positively correlated in normal times and
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become negatively correlated at the ZLB. This is consistent with the time-varying correlation ob-
served during the Great Recession. In normal times investors can hedge falling equity prices by
selling real bond holdings. However, in times of extremely poor growth prospects when monetary
policy becomes constrained, real bond prices also fall and no longer provide insurance to investors.
Consequently, investors are unable to obtain portfolio insurance from real bonds at precisely the
time they value it the most. A normative asset pricing implication of the model is that holding a
combination of both real and nominal bonds is optimal in a diversified portfolio. Real bonds hedge
declines in equity prices during normal times, while nominal bonds’ inflation exposure hedges
declines in equity prices during recessions.
This paper contributes to overlapping active areas of the macroeconomic and asset pricing
literatures that seek to better understand jointly quantity and price dynamics. In the asset pricing
literature, Bansal and Yaron (2004) and Croce (2014) show the importance of recursive preferences
and long-run risk in reconciling key asset pricing moments including a low risk-free rate and a large
equity risk premium, while Piazzesi and Schneider (2007) and Bansal and Shaliastovich (2013)
study the term structure implications in models with exogenous inflation dynamics, reconciling an
upward sloping nominal term structure and bond return predictability. In a reduced form setup,
Campbell, Sunderam, and Viceira (2013) study the time-varying comovement of equity and bond
returns.
To better understand the connection between asset pricing and macroeconomics, Rudebusch
and Wu (2008), Bekaert, Cho, and Moreno (2010), Swanson and Rudebusch (2012), Li and
Palomino (2014), Kung (2015), and Campbell, Pflueger, and Viceira (2015) endogenize inflation
with price rigidities via the New-Keynesian frameworks of Clarida, Galı´, and Gertler (1999) and
Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2007). These studies find that nominal rigidities and monetary policy
play key roles in understanding the properties of the term structure.
Concurrently, economists have explored the empirical and theoretical implications of the ZLB.
Kim and Singleton (2012) compare the performance of various term-structure models with a ZLB
to observed Japanese yields, showing shadow rate models in the spirit of Black (1995) perform
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well. Swanson and Williams (2014) argue that medium- and longer-term interest rates during the
Great Recession imply the ZLB was not a large constraint on monetary policy. Campbell, Shiller,
and Viceira (2009) and Pflueger and Viceira (2016) study the dynamics of the bond markets during
the Great Recession, showing liquidity was an important bond factor during these times.
In general equilibrium models, Adam and Billi (2006), Basu and Bundick (2015), Nakata
(2012), and Ferna´ndez-Villaverde, Gordon, Guerro´n-Quintana, and Rubio-Ramı´rez (2015) ana-
lyze the nonlinear macroeconomic consequences of the liquidity trap. These theoretical papers
show that liquidity traps are characterized by greater declines in consumption, inflation, and labor
and increases in uncertainty. As is traditional in the macroeconomic ZLB literature, these papers
use exogenous demand shocks (i.e., shocks to the subjective discount factor) to reach the ZLB.
This paper makes an important methodological contribution to the ZLB literature by introduc-
ing long-run supply shocks (i.e., small but highly persistent long-run productivity news shocks) as
a mechanism of reaching the ZLB. In the model, negative long-run supply shocks result in falling
wages and declining labor. Declining productivity and labor implies declining consumption growth
and falling real yields. In addition, declining labor reduces firms’ marginal costs, which result in
falling inflation. Via the Fisher relationship, falling real rates and inflation thus results in falling
nominal rates. As presented next, these dynamics are empirically consistent with data during the
Great Recession. More broadly, this paper contributes to the New-Keynesian macroeconomic and
long-run risk asset pricing literatures by studying the ZLB implications for bond and equity mar-
kets. The general equilibrium model allows theoretical insights into the mechanisms driving the
asset pricing dynamics during the crisis, including the comovement of equity prices and real yields.
Next I discuss the theoretical model and then the empirical evidence of quantities and prices
during the Great Recession in section 3. The model’s results are presented in section 4. Section 5
concludes.
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CHAPTER 2: MODEL
Households
Households choose consumption Ct, leisure Lt, labor Nt, and nominal discount bond holdings
Bt to maximize lifetime utility Ut given by Epstein and Zin (1989) (EZ) recursive preferences
Ut =
[
(1− β) C˜1−
1
ψ
t + βEt
[
U1−γt+1
] 1− 1ψ
1−γ
] 1
1− 1
ψ
C˜t =C
ϕ
t (AtLt)
1−ϕ
1 =Nt + Lt
where C˜t is the consumption-leisure bundle, At is labor-augmenting productivity, and the time
endowment is normalized to 1. ψ and γ are the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and risk
aversion. When γ = 1
ψ
, EZ recursive preferences collapse to time-separable CRRA preferences.
The household’s budget constraint is
PtCt +
Bt+1
Ift
≤Bt +WtNt
where Pt is the price of consumption Ct, I
f
t is the nominal interest rate, and Wt is the nominal
wage rate. The real stochastic discount factor (SDF) Mt+1 is
Mt+1 =β∆C
− 1
ψ
t+1
 Ut+1
Et
[
U1−γt+1
] 1
1−γ
 1ψ−γ
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and the real and nominal bond Euler equations are
1 =Et
[
Mt+1R
f
t
]
1 =Et
[
Mt+1
Ift
Πt+1
]
where Rft is the real risk-free interest rate and inflation Πt+1 =
Pt+1
Pt
. Labor supply is determined
by
Wt
Pt
=
1− ϕ
ϕ
(
Ct
Lt
)
Intermediate Goods Firms
Monopolistically competitive firms maximize discounted future real profits by choosing labor
demand Nit and prices Pit to produce Yit. Firms have constant returns to scale production tech-
nologies
Yit =AtNit
Firms’ labor demand leads to the intratemporal condition
Wt =MCit ·MPNit
where MCit and MPNit are the firms’ marginal costs and marginal product of labor. Prices
are assumed to be sticky a` la Calvo (1983). Each period, firms can update their price Pit with
probability 1− θ. Maximizing discounted future real profits, firms choose price Pit as
Pit
Pt
=
η
η − 1
Et
[∑∞
j=0 θ
jMt,t+jΠ
η
t+jYt+jmci,t+j
]
Et
[∑∞
j=0 θ
jMt,t+jΠ
η−1
t+j Yt+j
]
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where Mt,t+j =
∏j
k=1Mt+k is the SDF from time t to t + j and mcit =
MCit
Pt
are real marginal
costs. Firms choose their price as a markup η
η−1 > 1 over discounted marginal costs.
Final Goods Firm
A final goods firm buys a continuum of intermediate goods Yit at prices Pit and produces the
aggregate good Yt with CES technology
Yt =
[∫ 1
0
Y
1− 1
η
it di
] 1
1− 1η
where η is the elasticity of substitution across different varieties of goods. Yit are chosen to mini-
mize total expenditure. At the optimum
Yit =
(
Pit
Pt
)−η
Yt
and the aggregate price index Pt is
Pt =
[∫ 1
0
P 1−ηit di
] 1
1−η
Government
Monetary policy follows a Taylor (1993) rule
I∗ft
I
=
(
I∗ft−1
I
)ρI [(
Yt
Y¯t
)βY (Πt
Π
)βpi (Pt
P¯t
)βP]1−ρI
eεi,t
subject to the zero lower bound
Ift = max
(
1, I∗ft
)
where εi,t is a monetary policy shock and ρI , βY , βpi, and βP represents the degree to which the
central bank smooths interest rates and targets the output gap, inflation gap, and price level gap.
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Y¯t = Y0e
µt follows a deterministic trend for output and the price level gap follows
Pt
P¯t
=
Πt
Π¯ t
Pt−1
P¯t−1
Π¯t = Πe
xpi,t
xpi,t = ρpixpi,t−1 + εpi,t
where εpi,t is an inflation target shock.
The price level gap response can be thought of as a reduced form setup of unconventional
monetary policy. In a standard Taylor rule, the central bank responds to the inflation gap, i.e.,
shocks to price level growth rates. However, at the ZLB, the central bank is constrained and can
no longer respond to deviations in the inflation gap. With price level targeting, the central bank is
able to credibly communicate that they will lower future policy rates to combat current price level
deviations. Credibly committing to lower future policy rates acts as stimulus today, and prevents
labor and inflation from falling as severely relative to a Taylor rule without price level targeting.
Aggregation
A symmetric equilibrium is imposed. The aggregate resource constraint is
Yt =Ct
Aggregate output is given by
Yt =
AtNt
St
St = (1− θ)
(
Pit
Pt
)−η
+ θΠηtSt−1
8
where price dispersion St ≥ 1 represents output loss due to the inefficiency of firms charging
different prices. Finally, prices follow
P 1−ηt = (1− θ)P 1−ηit + θP 1−ηt−1
Technology
Productivity growth follows a deterministic trend µ and is exposed to short and long-run risk,
where long-run risk xt is a small but highly persistent process.
ln ∆At+1 =µ+ xt + εa,t+1
xt+1 =ρxxt + εx,t+1
εa,t, εx,t, εi,t, and εpi,t are Gaussian random variables. All shocks except εx,t and εpi,t are assumed
to be mutually independent.
Asset Prices
Denoting time units in quarters, define the one quarter excess bond holding period returns as
exr$t,n =it,n − it+1,n−1 − it,1
exrrt,n =rt,n − rt+1,n−1 − rt,1
exrpit,n =bt,n − bt+1,n−1 − bt,1
where it,n and rt,n are the log nominal and real interest rates from time t to t + n and defining
breakeven inflation bt,n = it,n − rt,n as the difference between nominal and real rates. exr$t,n rep-
resents the excess return over the short-term nominal risk-free rate of buying an n period nominal
bond at time t and selling it as an n− 1 period bond at time t+ 1. exrrt,n and exrpit,n are analogous
to exr$t,n, defined over real bonds and breakeven inflation. Returns of 3 year bonds over a quarterly
holding period are computed empirically.
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The market return RMt is defined as the return to a claim on the consumption stream
1 =Et
[
Mt+1R
M
t+1
]
RMt+1 =
PCt+1 + Ct+1
PCt
Denote the log market return as rMt,n from time t to t+ n and define the excess equity return as
exrMt,n =r
M
t,n − rt,n
Note that the real rate is known at time t while the equity return is realized at time t + n. Risk
premiums are conditional expectations of excess returns. For illustration purposes, assuming the
SDF and inflation are jointly log-normal, the risk premiums of the expected returns defined in the
empirical section are
Et
[
exrMt,n
]
=− Covt
(
mt,1, r
M
t,n
)
Et
[
exr$t,j,n
]
=Et
[
exrrt,j,n
]
+ Et
[
exrpit,j,n
]
Et
[
exrrt,j,n
]
=Covt (mt,1, rt+j,n−j)
Et
[
exrpit,j,n
]
=Covt (mt,1, pit+j,n−j) + Covt (pit,1,mt+j,n−j) + κpi,t
where mt,j =
∑j
k=1 lnMt+k and pit,j =
∑j
k=1 ln Πt+k are the j period log SDF and inflation rates.
The equity risk premium is determined by the negative covariance of market return with the SDF.
Equities that have low returns in bad economic times will command a positive risk premium.
The nominal bond risk premium can be decomposed into the real bond risk premium and
the breakeven inflation risk premium. The real bond risk premium is determined by the positive
covariance between the SDF and future real rates. Real bonds are hedges and command a negative
risk premium if future real bond prices rise in bad economic times. The breakeven inflation risk
premium is a function of the positive covariance between short-run SDF and inflation with future
long-run inflation and SDF. Breakeven inflation exposures are risky and command a positive risk
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premium if inflation rises during bad economic times, resulting in lower real returns on nominal
bonds.
Solution Method
Denote the stationary variable Vt ≡
(
Ut
At
)1− 1
ψ
. An equilibrium is defined as {Vt, Nt, ζt, ξt} that
satisfies the Bellman equation, nominal bond Euler equation, and firms’ price setting first order
conditions
Vt = (1− β)
(
C˜t
At
)1− 1
ψ
+ βEt
[
∆A1−γt+1 V
1−γ
1− 1
ψ
t+1
] 1− 1ψ
1−γ
1 =Et
[
Mt+1
Ift
Πt+1
]
ζt =MCt · Yt
At
+ θEt
[
Mt+1Π
η
t+1ζt+1∆At+1
]
ξt =
Yt
At
+ θEt
[
Mt+1Π
η−1
t+1 ξt+1∆At+1
]
subject to the intratemporal constraints (see Appendix C for complete specification). The time t
value and policy functions are functions of four endogenous and three exogenous state variables.
The endogenous state variables are the lagged nominal interest rate Ift−1, the lagged output gap
Yt−1
Y¯t−1
,
the lagged price level gap Pt−1
P¯t−1
, and lagged price dispersion St−1. The exogenous state variables
are long-run productivity risk xt, monetary policy shock εi,t, and cumulative inflation target shock
xpi,t.
To accurately capture the effects of the occasionally binding ZLB, the non-linear model is
solved with the global solution method time iteration of Coleman (1990). Given today’s value and
policy functions, expectations in the intertemporal Bellman equation, nominal bond Euler equa-
tion, and firms’ price setting FOCs are computed for time t+ 1 variables. Using Newton’s method
with a symbolic Jacobian, time t value and policy functions are updated. The iterations are stopped
when the maximum change in any updated value or policy function is less than 1 · e−8. Piecewise
linear splines are used for function approximations because they are shape preserving and have
smaller Euler errors around the ZLB than cubic splines or Chebyshev polynomials. Numerical
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integration is performed using Gauss-Hermite quadrature. Grid bounds for the endogenous state
variables are chosen such that they contain ±3 standard deviations from the stochastic steady state
when simulated for 12,000 periods (i.e. 1,000 years).
To check the accuracy of the approximation, Euler errors for the nominal interest rate are
plotted in Figure B.1. The average and maximum relative error are 0.1% and 1.3% of the nominal
interest rate’s stochastic steady state, which correspond to annualized pricing errors of 0.6 bps and
8 bps respectively.
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CHAPTER 3: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
Data Sources
Productivity growth is from Fernald (2014). Real consumption and wages are from the Bureau
of Economic Analysis (BEA). Consumption is defined as non-durable expenditures plus services.
Wages are defined as wages and salaries. Both series are deflated by their corresponding price
indices. The wage rate is defined as wages divided by hours worked. Hours worked are from
Valerie Ramey’s website. Consistent with Ohanian and Raffo (2012)’s construction, hours worked
are normalized by total hours, where total hours per year is defined as civilian noninstitutional
population over 16 multiplied by 14 working hours per day × 365 days per year. The population
series is from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). Inflation is measured using the consumer price
index for all urban consumers (CPI) from the BLS. All macroeconomic data is measured quarterly.
Forecasts of real total consumption expenditure are from the Survey of Professional Forecasters
(SPF).
The 3 month effective federal funds rate is from the Federal Reserve’s Economic Database
(FRED). Inflation swaps are from Datastream. Nominal bond yields are from the Center for Re-
search in Security Prices (CRSP) Risk Free Rate and Fama-Bliss discount bond files. Real bond
yields are from the Federal Reserve’s FAME database, who estimate zero-coupon, carry adjusted
yield curves using on- and off-the-run Treasury Inflation Protected Securities (TIPS). The 3 month
real interest rate is interpolated from the yield curve using a cubic spline. The market return is the
value weighted return of all firms from the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ from CRSP. Real market
returns are constructed by deflating the market price index and dividends by the CPI.
Macroeconomic Quantities
The Great Recession saw large movements of both macroeconomic quantities and asset prices.
As shown in Figure 7.1, by 2007 productivity growth was declining and continued falling through
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2009. Using predictive regressions, expected productivity is estimated by regressing productivity
growth onto lagged consumption growth and lagged price-dividend ratio
∆at+1 = β0 + β1∆ct + β2pdt + εt+1
Expected productivity growth during this time period was also declining. In an effort to stimulate
the economy, the Federal Reserve began lowering the Federal Funds rate in September of 2007
and continued lowering the rate until they effectively became constrained by the ZLB in December
2008. The policy rate remained between 0% to 0.25% through 2015.
Simultaneously during the recession, consumption growth, hours worked and inflation fell
sharply. Over the course of the recession from 2007Q4 to 2009Q2, cumulative quarterly con-
sumption growth was -1.24% and hours worked fell by 7.66%. At the recession’s trough when
the Federal Reserve hit the ZLB, inflation fell so dramatically that it culminated in deflation over
2008Q4 to 2009Q1 with an annualized rate of -6.6%. Uncertainty, as proxied for using volatility
of analysts’ forecasts, for consumption growth also spiked during this period.
Asset Prices
During the recession, stock prices fell -53%, as shown in Figure 7.2. From the start of the
recession in 2007Q4 to the 2008Q3, the 3-month nominal and real bond yields fell -3.46% and
-2.57%. At the ZLB over 2008Q4 to 2009Q1, the 3 year nominal bond yield fell, with short-term
yields falling faster, causing a positive and increasing nominal spread. Real bond yields rose, with
short-term yields rising faster, implying a negative real spread increasing in magnitude. Breakeven
inflation, defined as the difference between nominal and real rates, fell and became negative. Short-
term breakeven inflation yields fell faster, causing a positive and increasing inflation spread.
Examining correlations between equity and real bond markets, the correlations between equity
returns and real yields is 0.44 over 2004 to 2008Q3, while the correlation became negative at the
ZLB over 2008Q4 to 2014 with a coefficient of -0.54. For robustness, Table A.1 and Table A.2
replicate the results for real yields and breakeven inflation using inflation swaps instead of TIPS.
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In addition to matching the dynamics observed during the Great Recession, the model also
matches unconditional equity and bond market moments. Examining correlations between equity
and bond markets, nominal and inflation excess returns are positively correlated with equity excess
returns while real and equity excess returns are negatively correlated unconditionally. Using a
long sample from the U.K., Bansal, Kiku, and Yaron (2012) show the real yield curve is downward
sloping. Although real bonds have only been actively trading since 2004 in the U.S, the average
quarterly yield spread between 3 year and 3 month real yields prior to the Great Recession is -
0.14%. A downward sloping real curve implies that real bonds provide investors insurance by
hedging declines in productivity and equity prices.
The empirical evidence during the Great Recession suggests the relationship between equity
and real bonds are structurally different at the ZLB. Furthermore, it implies real bonds cease to
provide investors portfolio insurance during extreme downturns, precisely when they value it most.
The theoretical source of this time variation is investigated in the next sections.
While understanding the implications of constrained monetary policy is important, empirically
it is difficult to measure due to the highly conditional nature of the ZLB and its infrequent ob-
servations. In addition, real bonds in the U.S. have only been trading actively since 2004. Since
measuring the potentially time-varying equity and bond market correlations at the ZLB is empiri-
cally challenging, it is important to appeal to general equilibrium models to help interpret the data
observed during the Great Recession and understand mechanisms at play.
In summary, the empirical dynamics for any general equilibrium model of the ZLB is clear. On
the macroeconomic side, the model must reach the ZLB via large drops in expected productivity
growth, consumption growth, and hours worked. With respect to prices, the path to the ZLB was
marked by falling equity prices, nominal yields, and real yields. Finally, the ZLB was marked by
large deflation, rising real yields, and equity returns that are negatively correlated with real yields.
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS
Calibration
The model is calibrated to match 1) the unconditional quantity and asset pricing moments in
the post-Bretton Woods era, 2) the empirical dynamics observed during the Great Recession, and
3) the conditional quantity and asset pricing moments at the ZLB. Over the 45 year span from
1971 to 2015, the Federal Reserve was at the effective ZLB (defined as less than 0.25% 3 month
nominal yield) for 7 years from 2009 to 2015, or 15.6% of the sample. The benchmark calibration
hits the effective ZLB 12.5% when simulated for a long sample.
The model is solved at a monthly frequency and annualized parameter values are reported.
For the benchmark calibration, mean productivity growth is calibrated to match the unconditional
consumption growth rate of 2.75%. Consistent with the long-run risk literature of Bansal and
Yaron (2004) and Croce (2014), the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is 2, risk aversion is
10, and expected productivity growth shocks have an annual persistence of 0.85. The subjective
discount factor is set to 0.985 and steady state labor hours is chosen to match the data in which
22% of total hours is devoted to working.
Consistent with the Taylor rule estimation in Table 6.12, the central bank places a weight
of 2.5 on the inflation gap and 0.6 on the price level gap. The inflation target is set to 2% to
match the Federal Reserve’s current long-run inflation target. As is standard in the New-Keynesian
literature, price elasticity and stickiness parameters are chosen to imply an average 25% markup
and 2 quarters of price stickiness.
The correlation between long-run productivity shocks and inflation target shocks is negative
away from the ZLB and uncorrelated at the ZLB. This matches the time-varying correlation be-
tween long-run expected productivity and expected inflation observed in the data. For example,
during the 1970’s with high inflation, higher expected inflation was correlated with lower expected
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consumption growth; while during the Great Recession, lower expected inflation is not correlated
with higher expected consumption growth.
Unconditional Moments
The model matches the unconditional means of consumption growth and labor. As in the
data, inflation volatility is relatively higher compared to consumption growth and the correlation
between consumption and inflation is positive on average.
For unconditional yields, the model does well in matching the level of the 3 month nominal
yield and the upward sloping nominal yield, as measured by the spread between the 3 year and 3
month nominal yield. As in the data, the standard deviation of the spread is less than the short rate.
With respect to real yields, the model matches the small but negative real yield spread. Standard
deviations and autocorrelations of the 3 year minus 3 month real spread are less than the 3 month
real yield. Finally, the model matches the upward sloping breakeven inflation spread and standard
deviations of the 3 month breakeven inflation yield and spread.
With respect to excess returns, the model matches the high equity risk premium, positive nom-
inal bond risk premium, and negative real bond risk premium. In addition, the model matches
nominal bond excess return volatility, and implies less volatile real bond excess returns relative to
nominal bond excess returns. The model replicates the unconditional correlations of excess returns
between equity and bond markets. During normal times, nominal bond and breakeven inflation ex-
cess returns are positively correlated with equity excess returns while real excess are negatively
correlated with equity excess returns.
The model is also consistent with the positive correlation between real yields and equity returns
observed during the pre-Great Recession. Finally, the model matches both equity and real bond’s
responses to long-run productivity shocks. Pre-crisis, both real rates and equity returns would fall
in response to negative long-run productivity declines.
Great Recession Dynamics
In terms of replicating the dynamics observed during the Great Recession, the model is fed
filtered short and long-run productivity from the data over 2007Q4 to 2009Q1. Corresponding
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to Table 6.7, the dynamics are broken up into two subperiods. In the first period, labeled ”Peak-
to-ZLB”, the model replicates the dynamics that occurred in reaching the ZLB from 2007Q4 to
2008Q3. Cumulative productivity growth is negative and close to the -1.42% empirical counterpart,
cumulative inflation is low but positive, and labor growth is negative. With respect to prices, equity
price, 3 month nominal yield, and 3 month real yields fall by 23%, 4.5%, and 3.8% in the model
compared to 23%, 3.5%, and 2.6% in the data.
In the second period when the nominal rate is constrained at the ZLB, productivity growth and
labor growth decrease by 13% and 11% in the model compared to 4.5% and 4.2% in the data. As
in the data, cumulative consumption growth is negative and both the data and model experience
deflation. With respect to prices, equity prices fall by 47% while the 3 month real yield rises 3% in
the model compared to 78% and 3% in the data, respectively. Finally, the model predicts that the
equity risk premium increases 0.74% at the ZLB relative to the unconditional equity risk premium.
Time-Varying ZLB Moments
The model is able to match conditional moments observed at the ZLB. With respect to quan-
tities, inflation and labor growth become negatively skewed. Uncertainty of consumption growth,
as measured by conditional volatility of expected consumption growth, increases. In addition,
consumption and inflation become negatively correlated.
At the ZLB, the real bond’s rate response to long-run productivity shocks reverses. While real
rates fall in normal times in response to a negative long-run productivity shock, real rates rise at the
ZLB in response to a negative long-run productivity shock. Equity returns continue to fall at the
ZLB. This time-varying response for real bonds produces a time varying correlation between real
bonds and equity markets. Using filtered productivity shocks from the Great Recession, the model
produces a negative correlation between real bonds and equities, consistent with the observed
negative correlation in the data.
In addition to the time-varying correlation, the ZLB produces asymmetric responses for equity
returns in response to positive and negative long-run productivity shocks. Equity returns fall fur-
ther in response to negative shocks than they rise in response to positive shocks. This increased
18
downside risk results in a time-varying, increasing equity risk premium at the ZLB.
ZLB Predictions
Given that empirical observations of being at the ZLB are rare, it is important to appeal to
structural models to help guide economists and policy makers’ assessment of the these extreme
times. The model makes two important predictions. First, the equity risk premium is increasing
at the ZLB. This channel has been explained above and is driven by the endogenous increase in
uncertainty of macrofundamentals created by the ZLB. Second, policy makers face the question if
the ZLB is an important constraint. The Federal Reserve seeks to stabilize short-run fluctuations
in labor markets while maintaining a long-run moderate and stable inflation rate. Ex-ante it is
unclear as to if the central bank should care about the costs of being constrained at the ZLB in the
face of declining long-run productivity growth. Given the short-run focus of the central bank, a
natural question to ask is how costly is the ZLB relative to normal times when we think about the
subsequent 5 year recovery period following a shock at the ZLB. Specifically, define
uˆt+j = ln
∂Ut+j
∂xt
Ut+j
L =
60∑
j=1
(
uˆZLBt+j − uˆSSt+j
)
uˆt+j denotes the percent change in utility at time t + j from a negative one standard deviation
decline in long-run productivity at time t. uˆZLBt+j − uˆSSt+j denotes the percent difference in utility
between the ZLB and stochastic steady state. Finally, summing up the difference over the next 60
months gives an estimate of the immediate cost following a period of constrained monetary policy.
In the benchmark model, the increase in the cost is 1.74% utils. Hence the inability for the central
bank to respond to long-run shocks at the ZLB has a moderate short-run cost and thus, per their
mandate, should be apart of their broader policy making consideration.
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Mechanisms
ZLB
In the model, intertemporal allocations depend on two channels: a wage channel and a savings
channel. In response to a negative long-run supply news shock, wages fall and households supply
less labor. To counteract this via the savings channel, the central bank lowers the nominal interest
rate to stimulate aggregate demand and increase demand for labor. On net, the wage channel dom-
inates and labor declines. Declining labor implies declining marginal costs and falling inflation.
At the ZLB, monetary policy becomes constrained and cannot further stimulate the economy,
resulting in a liquidity trap. Households foresee falling future prices and delay current consump-
tion, decreasing current aggregate demand and further decreasing demand for labor. Thus in nor-
mal times, the savings channel counteracts the wage channel, while at the ZLB, the savings channel
amplifies the effects of the wage channel. The liquidity trap at the ZLB results in larger declines
in consumption, labor, and inflation with respect to negative long-run productivity news relative to
normal times. Hence, the ZLB is characterized by negatively skewed and increasingly uncertain
macrofundamentals.
Given the constraint of the ZLB, the real rate must rise to offset falling expected inflation. In
equilibrium, future consumption growth increases due to the asymmetric response of labor’s re-
sponse to the liquidity trap. In response to a negative long-run supply shock at the ZLB, labor
falls relatively more than in normal times. The negative skewness in the level of current labor im-
plies positive future labor growth and hence positive future consumption growth. Increasing future
consumption growth implies increasing future real rates via the nominal bond’s Euler equation.
Finally, as equity is modeled as a levered consumption claim in the model, the negatively skewed
consumption growth at the ZLB results in negatively skewed and more volatile equity returns.
EZ Preferences
With respect to asset prices, liquidity traps at the ZLB result in an increasing equity risk pre-
mium. In response to the increased downside risk at the ZLB from negatively skewed equity
returns, risk averse investors demand a higher equity risk premium. This implication is absent
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without Epstein Zin recursive preferences. Recursive preferences allow the IES to be disentangled
from risk aversion. With CRRA preferences, risk aversion is equal the reciprocal of the IES. When
the IES is less than 1, agents are relatively more impatient and the wealth effect dominates the sub-
stitution effect, implying counterfactually investors use equity claims to provide insurance against
bad times. In this case, the model’s equity risk premium is negative.
When the IES is greater than 1, the return to consumption falls in response to negative long-run
supply news shocks, generating a positive equity risk premium. However, with CRRA preferences,
risk aversion is less than 1 and the model’s implications are muted as investors do not sufficiently
price the downside risk. As discussed in Bansal and Yaron (2004) and Colacito, Ghysels, Meng,
and Siwasarit (2016), when the IES and risk aversion are allowed to both be greater than 1, in-
vestors with EZ preferences dislike negatively skewed and increasing uncertain equity claims and
command a higher risk premium relative to agents with CRRA preferences.
Holding risk aversion fixed at 10 and comparing the benchmark calibration to CRRA prefer-
ences where IES is 1
10
, a negative 3 standard deviation long-run productivity shock at the ZLB re-
sults in an increase in the equity risk premium by 0.40% and 0.01% for EZ and CRRA preferences,
respectively. Hence having agents with EZ preferences is crucial to produce both qualitatively and
quantitatively interesting asset pricing implications in response to the endogenous macroeconomic
ZLB dynamics.
Sensitivity Analysis
No ZLB
When the ZLB is not enforced, the model fails to match the time-varying macroeconomic and
asset pricing moments. In contrast to the data at the ZLB, labor and inflation are not negatively
skewed, consumption and inflation remain positively correlated, real rates continue to fall in re-
sponse to negative long-run productivity shocks, and real rates remain positively correlated with
equity returns. Finally, the model without the ZLB does not predict an increase in the equity risk
premium at the ZLB.
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CRRA: IES<1
With CRRA preferences, risk aversion is equal to the IES. Examining the impact of CRRA
preferences when the IES is less than 1 and holding risk aversion to 10, we see the model fails
to qualitatively reproduce many unconditional and conditional moments. Counterfactually, the
nominal yield spread, nominal bond risk premium, and equity premium are negative. In addition,
the calibration produces real bond excess returns that are strongly positively correlated with equity
excess returns while breakeven inflation excess returns are negatively correlated with equity excess
returns. Finally, equity returns rise in response to negative long-run productivity shocks, resulting
in a positive correlation between real bond rates and equity returns at the ZLB.
CRRA: IES>1
Examining the impact of CRRA preferences by holding the IES to 2, we see that the model
produces quantitatively incorrect asset pricing moments. The nominal yield spread and equity pre-
mium are low at 0.01% and 0.15%, while the nominal bond premium overshoots at 4.07%. The
model predicts a very small increase in the equity risk premium at the ZLB. With EZ preferences,
agents care about time-varying uncertainty and negatively skewed returns. With CRRA prefer-
ences, this channel is absent and agents do not price the endogenous increasing macroeconomic
uncertainty and negatively skewed consumption growth at the ZLB. Hence the increase in the eq-
uity premium is magnitudes smaller than compared with EZ preferences. In regards to welfare,
with CRRA preferences such that the IES=2, the short-run cost of constrained monetary policy is
7 magnitudes smaller than compared to EZ preferences.
Long-Run Productivity and Inflation Target Correlation
As discussed in Piazzesi and Schneider (2007), negatively correlated consumption growth and
inflation produces an upward sloping nominal yield curve. A positive correlation between inflation
target shocks and long-run productivity shocks produces negatively correlated consumption and
inflation, allowing the model to match unconditional nominal bond market moments. In addition,
the positive correlation allows the model to replicate the positive correlation between nominal bond
and equity excess returns observed in the data.
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GHH Preferences & Interest Rate Smoothing
For robustness, other consumption-leisure bundle aggregators and monetary policy rules were
considered. Specifically, GHH consumption-leisure bundle aggregators and Taylor rules with in-
terest rate smoothing were explored. GHH preferences are commonly used in macroeconomics as
there is no wealth effect on the labor supply. Interest rate smoothing is also commonly used in
monetary policy models under the argument that the central bank seeks to smooth its policy im-
plementation over time. Unfortunately, calibrations that produce empirically consistent estimates
when the ZLB is not enforced fail to result in an equilibrium when the ZLB is enforced. This is a
common issue in the ZLB literature and has been explored in Ferna´ndez-Villaverde et al. (2015).
The ZLB is characterized by falling inflation. At the ZLB, falling inflation causes depressed labor
today, which results in a higher future consumption growth rate, such that the real rate rises to
offset falling expected inflation in the nominal bond Euler equation. However, in equilibrium, in-
flation is the discounted sum of marginal costs from the firm’s price setting decision. Falling labor
results in declining marginal costs, which further depresses inflation. Falling inflation than further
depresses labor, resulting in a deflationary spiral. Given the calibration, the deflationary spiral may
be so extreme that an equilibrium is prevented. This was the case when GHH preferences and
interest rate smoothing was explored with calibrations similar to the benchmark.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION
I show that in a New-Keynesian model subject to the zero lower bound (ZLB), constrained
monetary policy endogenously results in increasing risk premium and time-varying equity-bond
market correlations. Liquidity traps at the ZLB are characterized by negatively skewed consump-
tion growth, labor growth, and inflation. Negatively skewed consumption growth results in neg-
atively skewed equity returns. Investors with recursive preferences price the increased downside
risk, resulting in a greater equity risk premium. While real bond yields fall in response to produc-
tivity declines in normal times, real bond yields increase at the ZLB in response to falling expected
inflation. Hence, equity returns and real bond yields become negatively correlated at the ZLB,
while positive in normal times.
These implications are empirically consistent with the comovement of macrofundamentals and
asset prices observed during the Great Recession. The model helps to explain why real bonds
ceased to provide investors insurance during the Great Recession, precisely when they valued it
most. Finally, the model predicts that equity risk premiums are increasing at the ZLB in response
to endogenously negatively skewed labor growth resulting in greater downside risk. An important
normative implication of this paper is that investors should optimally hold a combination of both
real and nominal bonds in their investment portfolio. Real bonds hedge productivity declines in
normal times while nominal bonds hedge deflation risk during recessions.
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TABLES
Table 6.1: Calibration
Preference Parameters
Subjective Discount Factor β 0.985
Intertemporal Elasticity of Substitution ψ 2
Risk Aversion γ 10
Technology Parameters
Mean of Productivity µ 2.75%
Persistence of Long-Run Risk ρa 0.85
Volatility of Short-Run Productivity Shocks σa 0.70%
Volatility of Long-Run Productivity Shocks σx 0.08%
Volatility of Monetary Policy Shocks σi 0.2%
Volatility of Price Level Shocks σpi 0.3%
Correlation of Long-Run Productivity ρx,pi 0.80(1ZLB-1)
and Inflation Target Shocks
Central Bank Parameters
Inflation Target pi 2%
Interest Rate Smoothing ρI 0
Output Gap βY 0
Inflation Gap βpi 2.5
Price Level Gap βP 0.6
New-Keynesian Parameters
Price Elasticity η 5
Price Stickiness θ 50%
The model is calibrated at a monthly frequency. Annualized parameter values are presented.
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Table 6.2: Macroeconomic Quantity Statistics
Data Model
Means
Consumption Growth E [∆c] 2.75% 2.75%
(0.29%)
Inflation E [pi] 4.08% 2.00%
(0.79%)
Labor E [N ] 0.22% 0.22%
(0.003%)
Standard Deviations
Consumption Growth σ (∆c) 0.90% 1.27%
(0.08%)
Inflation σ (pi) 1.71% 1.47%
(0.27%)
Labor Growth σ (∆N) 1.41% 0.86%
(0.12%)
Autocorrelations
Consumption Growth ρ (∆c) 0.52 0.19
(0.10)
Inflation ρ (pi) 0.62 0.95
(0.15)
Labor ρ (N) 0.99 0.63
(0.10)
Statistics calculated using quarterly data from 1971 to 2014. Means are annualized. Bootstrapped
standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 6.3: Time-Varying Macroeconomic Quantity Statistics
Unconditional: 1971-2014 ZLB: 2008Q4-2014Q4
Data Model Data Model
Standard Deviations
Expected Consumption σ (E[∆c]) 0.67% 0.40% 0.80% 0.66%
(0.08%) (0.23%)
Skewness
Consumption Growth sk (∆c) -0.41 -0.11 -0.46 -0.79
(0.22) (0.55)
Inflation sk (pi) 0.60 0.09 -1.96 -0.59
(0.45) (1.25)
Labor Growth sk (∆n) -0.56 -0.21 -1.32 -1.83
(0.35) (0.75)
Correlations w/
Consumption Growth
Inflation ρ (∆c, pi) -0.16 -0.54 0.38 0.49
(0.16) (0.31)
Labor Growth ρ (∆c,∆n) 0.40 0.66 0.77 0.74
(0.10) (0.28)
Statistics calculated using quarterly data from 1971 to 2014. Standard deviations are annualized.
Standard deviation at the ZLB of expected consumption growth calculated using SPF analysts’
forecasts of expected consumption growth over 2008Q4-2009Q1. Skewness and correlations at
the ZLB in the data is sample statistic over 2008Q4-2014Q4. ZLB moments in the model is the
conditional moment conditioned on being at the ZLB. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 6.4: Yield Statistics
Maturity 1Q 3Y-1Q
Data Model Data Model
Nominal Yields
Mean 5.10% 5.81% 0.85% 0.79%
(0.96%) (0.13%)
Standard Deviation 3.43% 2.72% 0.88% 1.46%
(0.58%) (0.11%)
Autocorrelation 0.98 0.85 0.79 0.86
(0.03) (0.03)
Real Yields
Mean 0.45% 2.41% -0.14% -0.15%
(0.57%) (0.09%)
Standard Deviation 2.14% 0.80% 1.28% 0.42%
(0.21%) (0.15%)
Autocorrelation 0.63 0.83 0.38 0.37
(0.07) (0.04)
Breakeven Inflation
Mean 1.00% 3.40% 0.77% 0.94%
(0.24%) (0.13%)
Standard Deviation 2.14% 2.88% 1.33% 1.31%
(0.33%) (0.20%)
Autocorrelation 0.58 0.91 0.46 0.95
(0.05) (0.06)
Statistics calculated using quarterly data from 1971 to 2014. Real and breakeven inflation yields
data begin in March 2004. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 6.5: Excess Return Statistics
Data Model
Means
Equity 6.16% 4.90%
(2.12%)
Nominal Bond 1.63% 1.20%
(0.68%)
Real Bond -0.24% -0.37%
(0.48%)
Breakeven Inflation -0.02% 1.58%
(0.40%)
Standard Deviations
Equity 14.76% 9.34%
(0.84%)
Nominal Bond 4.17% 4.08%
(0.46%)
Real Bond 1.93% 0.80%
(0.58%)
Breakeven Inflation 1.23% 4.52%
(0.68%)
Correlations
w/ Equity
Nominal Bond 0.23 0.73
(0.16%)
Real Bond -0.05 -0.91
(0.09%)
Breakeven Inflation 0.35 0.81
(0.07%)
Statistics calculated using quarterly data from 1971 to 2007. Means and standard deviations are an-
nualized. Data for real and breakeven inflation yields begin in March 2004. Bootstrapped standard
errors in parentheses.
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Table 6.6: Time-Varying Return Statistics
Pre-ZLB: 1971-2008Q3 ZLB: 2008Q4-2014Q4
Data Model Data Model
Standard Deviation
Equity Return 14.85 8.94 16.54 9.68
(1.04) (3.55)
Skewness
Equity Return -0.26 0.04 -1.81 -0.19
(0.27) (0.56)
Response to Long-Run
Productivity Shock
Real Yield 0.37 0.44 -1.58 -0.31
(0.36) (0.47)
Equity Return 1.66 3.16 3.32 3.50
(0.40) ( 1.61)
Correlation between 0.23 0.39 -0.75 -0.67
Equity Return & (0.16) (0.27)
Real Yield
Statistics calculated using quarterly data. Means and standard deviations are annualized. Data for
real and breakeven inflation yields begin in March 2004. Correlations at the ZLB in the model is
the conditional correlation at the ZLB. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses for standard
deviations, skewness, and correlations. For responses to long-run productivity shock, values re-
ported are responses of 3 month real yield and equity return to a 1 standard deviation increase in
filtered expected productivity growth shocks.
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Table 6.7: ZLB Dynamics
Peak-to-ZLB: 2007Q4-2008Q3 ZLB: 2008Q4-2009Q1
Data Model Data Model
Quantities
Productivity -1.42% -2.38% -4.51% -12.97%
Consumption 0.07% -2.92% -1.74% -24.00%
Inflation 5.35% 2.56% -6.57% -3.73%
Labor -1.68% -0.56% -4.18% -10.91%
Prices
Nominal Rate -3.46% -4.54%
Real Rate -2.57% -3.79% 6.37% 2.95%
Equity Price -22.64% -27.15% -78.49% -47.17%
Equity Premium 4.87% 5.61%
Data are quarterly. Peak-to-ZLB is defined as change from 2007Q4 to 2008Q3. ZLB is defined as
change from 2008Q4 to 2009Q1. Productivity, expected productivity, consumption, and inflation
are cumulative growth rates. Labor and equity price are percent change in levels. Nominal and real
rates are changes in 3 month yields. All values annualized.
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Table 6.8: Sensitivity Analysis: Part 1
Moment Data Benchmark No ZLB CRRA:IES¡1
Means of 3y-3m Spread
Nominal Yield 0.85% 0.79% 0.93% -0.95%
Real Yield -0.14% -0.15% -0.17% -1.11%
Breakeven Inflation Yield 0.77% 0.94% 1.10% 0.16%
Risk Premiums
Nominal Bond 1.63% 1.20% 1.41% -2.29%
Real Bond -0.24% -0.37% -0.43% -2.77%
Breakeven Inflation 1.17% 1.58% 1.84% 0.48%
Equity Premium 6.16% 4.90% 5.15% - 2.84%
Equity Premium at ZLB 5.30% 4.73% -14.89%
Standard Deviation
Expected Consumption Growth 0.67% 0.33% 0.32% 0.03%
Equity Return 14.85% 8.96% 9.27% 70.12%
Standard Deviation at ZLB
Expected Consumption Growth 0.80% 0.66% 0.36% 0.08%
Equity Return 16.54% 9.78% 8.68% 121.79%
Skewness
Consumption -0.50 -0.01 -0.03 0.03
Inflation 1.07 0.03 0.05 0.04
Labor -0.33 -0.27 -0.09 -0.08
Equity Return -0.26 0.03 -0.02 0.18
Skewness at ZLB
Consumption -0.46 -1.46 0.01 -0.71
Inflation -1.96 -0.90 -0.01 -1.01
Labor -1.32 -2.04 -0.05 -0.91
Equity Return -1.81 -0.18 0.11 -0.14
Unconditional statistics calculated using quarterly data from 1971 to 2014. ZLB statistics calcu-
lated over 2008Q4 to 20014Q4. ZLB in the model is defined as negative 3 standard deviation
long-run productivity in excess of the ZLB. Means and risk premiums are annualized.
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Table 6.9: Sensitivity Analysis: Part 2
Moment Data CRRA:IES¿1 ρ=0 CES:f=0.5
Means of 3y-3m Spread
Nominal Yield 0.85% 0.04% -0.38% 1.02%
Real Yield -0.14% 0.03% -0.25% -0.14%
Breakeven Inflation Yield 0.77% 0.01% -0.13% 1.16%
Risk Premiums
Nominal Bond 1.63% 0.05% -0.72% 1.54%
Real Bond -0.24% 0.04% -0.51% -0.42%
Breakeven Inflation 1.17% 0.01% -0.20% 1.96%
Equity Premium 6.16% 0.03% 4.88% 5.33%
Equity Premium at ZLB 0.04% 5.44% 4.72%
Standard Deviation
Expected Consumption Growth 0.67% 0.33% 0.38% 0.09%
Equity Return 14.85% 10.16% 9.24% 9.78%
Standard Deviation at ZLB
Expected Consumption Growth 0.80% 0.40% 0.56% 0.12%
Equity Return 16.54% 9.90% 10.27% 9.80%
Skewness
Consumption -0.50 -0.04 -0.12 0.04
Inflation 1.07 0.13 -0.06 0.08
Labor -0.33 -0.07 -0.07 -0.04
Equity Return -0.26 0.07 -0.06 -0.01
Skewness at ZLB
Consumption -0.46 -1.24 -1.07 -0.29
Inflation -1.96 -0.60 -0.62 -0.51
Labor -1.32 -1.92 -1.65 -1.86
Equity Return -1.81 -0.13 -0.30 -0.12
Unconditional statistics calculated using quarterly data from 1971 to 2014. ZLB statistics calcu-
lated over 2008Q4 to 20014Q4. ZLB in the model is defined as negative 3 standard deviation
long-run productivity in excess of the ZLB. Means and risk premiums are annualized.
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Table 6.10: Sensitivity Analysis: Part 3
Moment Data Benchmark No ZLB CRRA:IES¡1
Welfare Cost at ZLB
Utils 1.73% 0.00% 20.98%
Correlations w/
Consumption Growth
Inflation -0.16 -0.55 -0.53 -0.13
Inflation at ZLB 0.38 0.51 -0.52 0.72
Correlations w/
Equity Excess Return
Nominal Excess Return 0.23 0.71 0.71 0.98
Real Excess Return -0.05 -0.91 -0.93 0.99
Breakeven Inflation Excess Return 0.35 0.81 0.80 -0.74
Response to
Long-Run Productivity Shock
Equity Return + + + -
Equity Return at ZLB + + + -
Real Yield + + + +
Real Yield at ZLB - - + -
Corr(Equity,Real) 0.44 0.39 0.52 0.01
Corr(Equity,Real) at ZLB -0.54 -0.46 0.21 0.71
Unconditional statistics calculated using quarterly data from 1971 to 2014. ZLB statistics calcu-
lated over 2008Q4 to 20014Q4. ZLB in the model is defined as negative 3 standard deviation
long-run productivity in excess of the ZLB. Means and risk premiums are annualized.
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Table 6.11: Sensitivity Analysis: Part 4
Moment Data CRRA:IES¿1 ρ=0 CES:f=0.5
Welfare Cost at ZLB
Utils 0.25% 1.03% 0.38%
Correlations w/
Consumption Growth
Inflation -0.16 -0.54 0.05 -0.44
Inflation at ZLB 0.38 0.09 0.37 -0.04
Correlations w/
Equity Excess Return
Nominal Excess Return 0.23 0.71 -0.03 0.77
Real Excess Return -0.05 -0.92 -0.86 -0.79
Breakeven Inflation Excess Return 0.35 0.80 0.17 0.85
Response to
Long-Run Productivity Shock
Equity Return + + + +
Equity Return at ZLB + + + +
Real Yield + + + +
Real Yield at ZLB - - - -
Corr(Equity,Real) 0.44 0.52 0.07 0.45
Corr(Equity,Real) at ZLB -0.54 -0.49 -0.43 -0.22
Unconditional statistics calculated using quarterly data from 1971 to 2014. ZLB statistics calcu-
lated over 2008Q4 to 20014Q4. ZLB in the model is defined as negative 3 standard deviation
long-run productivity in excess of the ZLB. Means and risk premiums are annualized.
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Table 6.12: Taylor Rule Estimation
Policy Parameter
Interest Rate Smoothing ρi 0.88
(0.03)
Output Gap βY -0.02 0.15
(0.13) (0.05)
Inflation Gap βpi 2.47 0.63
(0.26) (0.13)
Price Level Gap βP 0.62 -0.01
(0.19) (0.08)
Statistics calculated using quarterly data from 1971 to 2007. Federal funds rate is used as the
policy rate. Output gap is defined as log real potential GDP minus log real GDP from FRED. Price
level gap is defined as deviations of the log price level from HP filtered log price level. Standard
errors in parentheses. One, two, and three stars denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
36
FIGURES
Figure 7.1: Quantities
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Figure 7.2: Returns
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Quarterly 3-month yields and equity returns plotted.
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Figure 7.3: IRF: Quantities
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Figure 7.4: IRF: Fisher Decomposition
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news shock. Shocks occur in time period 1. ”Normal” (”ZLB”) refers to the response of the model
when it is at the stochastic steady state (ZLB). ”Normal” is demeaned while responses in ”ZLB”
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Figure 7.5: IRF: Returns
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news shock. Shocks occur in time period 1. ”Normal” (”ZLB”) refers to the response of the model
when it is at the stochastic steady state (ZLB). ”Normal” is demeaned while responses in ”ZLB”
are relative to mean-reverting trends. All rates annualized.
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Figure 7.6: IRF: Stochastic Discount Factor
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42
Figure 7.7: IRF: Consumption Growth Moments
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Figure 7.8: IRF: Equity Risk Premium
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news shock. Shocks occur in time period 1. ”Normal” (”ZLB”) refers to the response of the model
when it is at the stochastic steady state (ZLB). ”Normal” is demeaned while responses in ”ZLB”
are relative to mean-reverting trends. All rates annualized.
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APPENDIX A: ROBUSTNESS STATISTICS
Table A.1: Yield Statistics Implied by Inflation Swaps
Maturity 1Q 3Y-1Q
Real Yields
Mean -0.18% 0.18%
(0.51%) (0.04%)
Standard Deviation 3.26% 1.47%
(0.16%) (0.07%)
Autocorrelation 0.77 0.43
(0.07%) (0.07%)
Breakeven Inflation
Mean 1.63% 0.44%
(0.20%) (0.08%)
Standard Deviation 2.82% 0.73%
(0.23%) (0.11%)
Autocorrelation 0.67 0.58
(0.06%) (0.08%)
Statistics calculated using quarterly data from April 2004 to 2014. Bootstrapped standard errors in
parentheses.
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Table A.2: Excess Return Statistics Implied by Inflation Swaps
Data
Means
Real Bond -0.22%
(0.39%)
Breakeven Inflation -0.04%
(0.31%)
Standard Deviations
Real Bond 2.61%
(0.50%)
Breakeven Inflation 2.41%
(0.55%)
Correlations w/ Equity Market
Real Bond -0.36
(0.09%)
Breakeven Inflation 0.53
(0.07%)
Means and standard deviations are annualized. Statistics calculated using quarterly data from April
2004 to 2014. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.
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Table A.3: Time-Varying Return Statistics Implied by Inflation Swaps
Pre-ZLB: 2004-2008Q3 ZLB: 2008Q4-2014Q4
Response to Long-Run
Productivity Shock
Real Yield 0.36 -0.85
(0.34) (0.30)
Correlation between 0.41 -0.61
Equity Return & (0.11) (0.20)
Real Yield
Statistics calculated using quarterly data. Data for inflation swaps begin in April 2004. Standard
errors in parentheses. For responses to long-run productivity shock, values reported are responses
of 3 month real yield to a 1 standard deviation increase in filtered expected productivity growth
shocks.
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APPENDIX B: EULER ERRORS
Figure B.1: Nominal Bond Euler Errors
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Relative nominal bond euler errors plotted as a function of the state variable expected productivity
growth. X-axis units are in terms of standard deviation of expected productivity growth. In green
is the first occurrence of the ZLB when the model is shocked with negative long-run productivity
shocks.
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APPENDIX C: MODEL DERIVATION
Households
Households choose consumption Ct, leisure Lt, nominal bond holdings Bt, and labor supply
Nt to maximize lifetime utility U0, where
Ut =
[
(1− β) C˜1−
1
ψ
t + βEt
[
U1−γt+1
] 1− 1ψ
1−γ
] 1
1− 1
ψ
C˜t =

[
ϕC
1− 1
f
t + (1− ϕ) (AtLt)1−
1
f
] 1
1− 1
f CES
Cϕt (AtLt)
1−ϕ CD f = 1
Ct − ϕAt N
1+ 1
f
t
1+ 1
f
GHH
1 ≥Nt + Lt
where At denotes labor-augmenting productivity. The household’s budget constraint is
PtCt +QtBt+1 ≤Bt +WtNt
The household takes the price of consumption Pt, the price of nominal bonds Qt, and the nominal
wage rate Wt as given. Nominal bonds are discount bonds and payoff $Bt dollars at time t. The
price of the nominal bond is the invesrse of the nominal interest rate, Qt = I
f−1
t . The Lagrangian
is
L =U0
+ · · ·
+λ1,t [Bt +WtNt − PtCt −QtBt+1]
+λ2,t [1−Nt − Lt]
+ · · ·
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The FOC w.r.t. consumption is
∂L
∂Ct
=
∂U0
∂Ct
− λ1,tPt = 0
λ1,tPt =
∂U0
∂Ct
The real SDF is
Mt+1 =
∂U0/∂Ct+1
∂U0/∂Ct
=

β∆C˜
1
f
− 1
ψ
t+1 ∆C
− 1
f
t+1
(
Ut+1
Et[U1−γt+1 ]
1
1−γ
) 1
ψ
−γ
CES
β∆C
− 1
ψ
t+1
(
Ut+1
Et[U1−γt+1 ]
1
1−γ
) 1
ψ
−γ
CD f = 1
β∆C˜
− 1
ψ
t+1
(
Ut+1
Et[U1−γt+1 ]
1
1−γ
) 1
ψ
−γ
GHH
The FOC w.r.t. leisure is
∂L
∂Lt
=
∂U0
∂Lt
− λ2,t = 0
λ2,t =
∂U0
∂Lt
The FOC w.r.t. labor is
∂L
∂Nt
=λ1,tWt − λ2,t = 0
Wt =
λ2,t
λ1,t
50
The FOC w.r.t. nominal bonds is
∂L
∂Bt+1
=Et [λ1,t+1]−Qtλ1,t = 0
Qt =Et
[
λ1,t+1
λ1,t
]
=Et
[
Mt+1
Πt+1
]
where Πt+1 =
Pt+1
Pt
is the inflation rate. The real and nominal Euler bond equations are
Rft =Et [Mt+1]
−1
Ift =Et
[
Mt+1
Πt+1
]−1
where Rft is the real risk-free interest rate.
Final Goods Firm
A final goods firm buys intermediate goods Yit to produce final goods Yt to maximize profits.
It takes intermediate goods prices Pit and final goods price Pt as given. It produces Yt with CES
technology
Yt =
[∫ 1
0
Y
1− 1
η
it di
] 1
1− 1η
Specifically, the final goods firm maximizes
max
Yit
PtYt −
∫ 1
0
PitYitdi
s.t. Yt =
[∫ 1
0
Y
1− 1
η
it di
] 1
1− 1η
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The Lagrangian is
L =Pt
[∫ 1
0
Y
1− 1
η
it di
] 1
1− 1η −
∫ 1
0
PitYitdi
The FOC w.r.t. intermediate goods
∂L
∂Yit
=Pt
(
Yt
Yit
) 1
η
− Pit = 0
Yit =
(
Pit
Pt
)−η
Yt
The price index is
PtYt =
∫ 1
0
PitYitdi
=
∫ 1
0
Pit
(
Pit
Pt
)−η
Ytdi
Pt =
[∫ 1
0
P 1−ηit di
] 1
1−η
Intermediate Goods Firms
Monopolistically competitive firms choose labor Nit and price Pit and produce intermediate
goods Yit to maximize discounted real profits. Firms take wages as given and use constant return
to scales production technologies
Fit =AtNit
Fit ≥Yit
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Specifically firms maximize
max
{Nit,Pit}
Et
[ ∞∑
j=0
Mt,t+j
(
Pi,t+jYi,t+1 −Wt+jNi,t+j
Pt+j
)]
s.t. Yit = AtNit
Yit ≥
(
Pit
Pt
)−η
Yt
The Lagrangian is
L =Et
[ ∞∑
j=0
Mt,t+j
(
Pi,t+jYi,t+j −WtNi,t+j
Pt+j
)]
+ · · ·
+λ1,t (Fit − Yit)
+λ2,t
(
Yit −
(
Pit
Pt
)−η
Yt
)
+ · · ·
The FOC w.r.t. to labor is
∂L
∂Nit
=− Wt
Pt
+ λ1,tFN,it = 0
Wt
Pt
=λ1,tFN,it
Note that Ptλ1,t = MCt are the firms’ nominal marginal costs. Firms’ prices are assumed to be
sticky a` la Calvo. Each period, firms can update their price Pit with probability 1−θ. Firms choose
the best price Pit at time t knowing that they will not be able to reoptimize in the next period with
probability θ, i.e. they maximize
max
Pit
Et
[ ∞∑
j=0
θj
Mt,t+j
Pt+j
(PitYi,t+j −Wt+jNi,t+j)
]
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Substituting in demand for labor and output, note that
PitYi,t+j −Wt+jNi,t+j =PitYi,t+j −MCt+jYi,t+j
= (Pit −MCt+j)
(
Pit
Pt+j
)−η
Yt+j
=
(
P 1−ηit −MCt+jP−ηit
)
P ηt+jYt+j
The Lagrangian is
L =Et
[ ∞∑
j=0
θjMt,t+j
(
P 1−ηit −MCt+jP−ηit
)
P η−1t+j Yt+j
]
The FOC w.r.t. firm’s price is
∂L
∂Pit
= Et
[ ∞∑
j=0
θjMt,t+j
(
(1− η)P−ηit + ηMCtP−η−1it
)
P η−1t+j Yt+j
]
= 0
This implies
Pit
Pt
=
η
η − 1
Et
[∑∞
j=0 θ
jMt,t+j
(
Pt+j
Pt
)η
Yt+jmct+j
]
Et
[∑∞
j=0 θ
jMt,t+j
(
Pt+j
Pt
)η−1
Yt+j
]
where mct = MCtPt are real marginal costs. The firm’s price setting equation can be written re-
currsively as
P ∗t =
η
η − 1
ζt
ξt
ζt =mct · Yt + θEt
[
Mt+1Π
η
t+1ζt+1
]
ξt =Yt + θEt
[
Mt+1Π
η−1
t+1 ξt+1
]
where P ∗t =
Pit
Pt
.
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Government
Monetary policy follows a Taylor (1993) rule
Ift
I
=
(
Ift−1
I
)ρI [(
Yt
Y¯t
)βY (Πt
Π
)βpi (Pt
P¯t
)βP]1−ρI
eεi,t
Yt
Y¯t
=
∆Yt
∆Y
Yt−1
Y¯t−1
Pt
P¯t
=
Πt
Π¯t
Pt−1
P¯t−1
Π¯t =Πe
xpi,t
xpi,t =ρpixpi,t + εpi,t
where εi,t and εpi,t are monetary policy and inflation target shocks.
Equilibrium
The aggregate resource constraint
Yt =Ct
Yt =
Ft
St
where price dispersion is
St = (1− θ)P ∗−ηt + θΠηtSt−1
Prices follow
1 = (1− θ)P ∗1−ηt + θΠη−1t
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Technology
Technology evolves according to
∆at+1 =µ+ xt + εa,t+1
xt+1 =ρxt + εx,t+1
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